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Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational Distribution of Lifetime
Consumption
Daniel Shaviro*
I. Introduction
Few topics in American politics are more discussed and less understood than the
federal budget deficit. This article, which is adapted from a chapter in a book in progress
entitled The Political Economy of Budget Deficits, discusses one of the main issues that
deficits raise: intergenerational equity, or the concern that deferring taxation relative to
government spending, and relying on actual or implicit debt financing for current or
projected future expenditure, reduces the lifetime consumption of future generations
relative to that of current generations. I begin by summarizing the main empirical
conclusions that the earlier chapters of the book reached after an extensive literature review. Obviously, I realize that the conclusions I state require greater support than they
receive in this selection. I then turn to the normative issues raised by intergenerational
distribution.
II. Summary of Empirical Conclusions
In the last two centuries, no question pertaining to budget deficits has received closer
or more consistent attention than that of their intergenerational effects. Writers since
David Ricardo have alternatively decried or denied the tendency of debt financing to shift
lifetime consumption from future to current generations, and from younger to older living
persons. Prominent decriers include Ricardo, who posited but rejected Ricardian
equivalence; Martin Feldstein, who argued that Social Security reduces saving and shifts
lifetime consumption from future to current generations; James Buchanan, who
challenged the Keynesian “no-burden, no-transfer” orthodoxy, and later helped develop
the public choice attack on debt financing; and Laurence Kotlikoff, who sought a broader
measure of fiscal policy’s inter-generational effects and advocated “generational
balance.” Prominent deniers include Robert Barro, with his Ricardian view of fiscal
policy as having no first-order intergenerational effects; and various Keynesians, based
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Anne Alstott and Richard
Craswell for comments on earlier drafts, and to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for financial
support.
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both on the “no-burden, no-transfer” claim, emphasized by Abba Lerner, that the burden
of public spending is borne currently no matter how it is financed, and on the claim, most
recently associated with Robert Eisner, that public debt enhances not only current gdp but
long-term economic growth.
My review of this debate has yielded a number of conclusions that are crucial
prerequisites to attempting a normative assessment of the intergenerational issues raised
by budget deficits. These conclusions include the following:
Conclusion 1: The Ricardian equivalence theorem, stated in strong form to assert that
the timing of taxation relative to spending has no first-order intergenerational
consequences, is incorrect. Ricardian offsets, or adjustments to bequests and lifetime
transfers between members of different generations to achieve preferred distributions no
matter what the government fiscal policy, may take place to some extent, but are
incomplete, mainly due to fiscal illusion (or a correct understanding that public debt may
remain outstanding indefinitely), as well as to the effects of strategic behavior and impure
altruism both within multigenerational households and between different households.
Nonetheless, the Ricardian analysis helps to demonstrate a number of important points,
including the difficulty of measuring the net intergenerational effects of government
fiscal policy, the fact that such policy provides only one of the many arenas in which the
generations interact, and the importance of people’s behavioral responses to government
policies, reflecting the policies’ perceived as well as actual effects.
Conclusion 2: Holding constant the amount and character of government spending,
and assuming no significant actual or perceived risk of default, debt financing, relative to
tax financing, tends in the long run to shift lifetime material consumption from future to
current generations. This results from debt financing generally yielding greater aggregate
perceived wealth than tax financing, both because a bondholder (unlike a taxpayer)
possesses a valuable asset that offsets the transfer of cash to the government, and
because, in the case of debt financing, people do not weigh the implied future taxes at
their present value equivalent in current taxes. Greater perceived wealth should lead to
greater lifetime spending on consumption (which is another way of saying that Ricardian
offsets are incomplete). One should keep in mind, however, that this is a ceteris paribus
conclusion. So many amorphous factors may affect people’s expectations and perceived
wealth that one cannot be certain of the effect’s significance and consistency in practice.
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This analysis of debt financing, relative to tax financing, also applies to “pay-as-yougo” financing where future revenue shortfalls are predictable, relative to accruing
sufficient reserves to achieve long-run solvency under present tax and spending rules.
While the similarity between explicit public debt and long-term revenue shortfalls most
often is made with regard to Social Security, it potentially applies to all government
budgeting. Suppose, for example, that the federal government currently is achieving
annual budgetary balance, but that future spending increases (say, to meet increased
needs in health care or national defense) are expected with near-certainty. A policy of
keeping taxes constant, and thus maintaining current budgetary balance but not accruing
the surpluses necessary to achieve long-term balance under existing policy, would favor
current over future generations relative to a policy of raising taxes now so as to achieve
such long-term balance. Obviously, the same point holds for surplus relative to balance
as for balance relative to deficit; future generations would benefit still more (all else
being equal) from our levying taxes in excess of anticipated long-term revenue needs.
Conclusion 3: Holding constant the amount and character of government taxation, a
debt-financed increase in government spending tends in the long run to shift lifetime
consumption from future to current generations. This is less definite, however, than
Conclusion 2, which was based on the reverse assumption of holding spending constant
and changing the level of taxation. What makes it less definite is the lack of specification
as to the character of the new government spending. If the spending is for long-term
investment—at least, relative to the private uses of resources that it replaces
(disregarding the Keynesian case of slack in the economy, where the resources would
otherwise have gone unused)—then it may instead have the opposite effect, shifting
lifetime consumption from current to future generations. The claim that, as a general
matter, increased government spending is more likely to benefit current generations is
based on the relatively short time horizon that political decisions, as distinct from private
household decisions, may tend to have, given politicians’ disinclination to look beyond
their terms in office, and voters’ rational ignorance of complex public issues and
incentive to maximize short-term benefits relative to other households.
An unfunded promise of future spending, no less than debt-financed current spending,
can shift lifetime consumption from future to current generations if it is credible. A good
example is provided by Social Security through the 1970s, which, by promising current
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workers benefits in excess of the value of their contributions, may have induced them to
save less overall than they would have otherwise—in effect, for the same reason that one
might save less if one expected to win the lottery upon retirement. Moreover, windfall increases in benefits to the elderly, such as that occurring in Social Security in 1972,
probably reduce saving as well even if they were not anticipated, since they act as a onetime wealth transfer to an age cohort with a relatively low propensity to save.
Conclusion 4: As suggested by Conclusions 2 and 3, a strong form of the “no-burden,
no-transfer” claim made by Keynesians such as Abba Lerner is incorrect. Although
government spending has a real resource cost to the society without regard to how it is
financed, the subjective burden on a bondholder, who voluntarily lends money to the
government based on a specific expectation of repayment with interest, generally is less
than that on a taxpayer, who pays involuntarily and with no such definite expectation.
Under some circumstances, however, the distinction between the two types of payors
may be murky. For example, despite the involuntary nature of Social Security taxes, a
contributor to Social Security may be more like a bondholder than a taxpayer, if the
program does not force him to save more overall than he would prefer, and if the
definiteness of his expectation of receiving future benefits with a present value at least
equal to that his contributions approaches that of a bondholder.
Lerner’s “no-burden, no-transfer” argument helps to remind us of two important
points, however. First, public debt, in terms of its direct effects, can transfer wealth only
between overlapping generations. Only currently living persons can make or receive
bond payments of principal and interest. As Lerner put it, public debt does not provide a
time machine enabling us to transfer wealth from the future to the present. Second, public
debt is a financial asset, not a real asset. Whereas real assets—both tangible, like a
factory, and intangible, like a living person’s set of skills—are components of existing
societal wealth, financial assets merely evidence people’s relative claims to such wealth.
Thus, in a real sense public debt has no direct relevance to the level of existing societal
wealth, although over time it may influence the level of such wealth through its effects on
behavior.
Conclusion 5: The traditional Keynesian claim that, short of full employment,
stimulative budget deficits do not shift consumption from the future to the present, but
instead increase consumption over the long-term, is incorrect, except perhaps under
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special circumstances (such as those prevailing during the Great Depression) when
capital markets are not well-functioning, and/or a crisis of confidence has caused
consumption and investment demand to collapse. No matter how socially undesirable and
even destructive one considers a high rate of unemployment, and no matter how
blameless the unemployed may be for the quirks in marketplace demand that (among
other causes) prevent them from finding jobs, the claim that much unemployment is
“involuntary,” in the technical, traditional Keynesian sense, is unpersuasive.
Accordingly, full employment is an artificially defined (however laudable) policy goal,
rather than a meaningful description of a distinct state of the economy, and the claim that,
when unemployment is regrettably high, there is economic “slack” that makes
government spending effectively cost-free, cannot be accepted. Contrary to the traditional
Keynesian position, society generally does face a tradeoff between increased
consumption today and increased consumption in the future. It may similarly face a
tradeoff between present and future employment, although this is less certain given the
complexity of causation for employment levels. The new Keynesian case for expanding
the money supply to combat the market failures that may deepen and prolong recessions
is reconcilable with this analysis, since it does not rely on liquidity traps that make
current consumption cost-free (although one could in theory imagine an instance where
the only effect of monetary stimulus was to eliminate the waste from failed short-term
market-clearing).
Conclusion 6: While budget deficits tend to indicate a transfer of lifetime
consumption from future to current generations—at least, relative to not having budget
deficits—they provide a poor measure of the overall intergenerational effects of
government fiscal policy. The deficit is a cash flow, not an economic, measure. Even
among accounting measures that depart from economic accrual to increase certainty and
ease of measurement, it stands out as crude and inaccurate. Its main flaws include
ignoring the present value of future government spending obligations, likely
expenditures, and taxes; taking no account of fluctuations in the value of government
assets (or private assets created through government expenditure); and measuring the current year’s change in the level of explicit national debt only nominally, rather than in real
terms that reflect the impact of inflation. The deficit’s flaws as a measure can lead both to
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honest misunderstanding of the intergenerational effects of government policy and to
deliberate “smoke and mirrors” manipulation.
Conclusion 7: Given the deficit’s flaws as a measure, one might want to consider
replacing it with generational accounting, which attempts to present a comprehensive
picture of the intergenerational effects of government fiscal policy. One could
alternatively argue, however, that generational accounting requires too many contestable
(and, in the wrong hands, manipulable) assumptions to provide explicit direction for
public policy. Given the deficit’s potentially greater determinacy, as well as its greater
salience to a public conditioned to fear rising explicit public debt, one could argue
instead that it should be retained as the primary measure, and voters or policymakers
better educated to see through “smoke and mirrors” deficit reduction, and to recognize
the importance of large-scale multi-year programs such as Social Security. Or one could
take an intermediate stance and argue for using present value computations of the deficit
and national debt as primary measures. Such measures would resemble generational accounting in reflecting the present value of the future taxes and outlays expected under
current policy, but would not attempt to allocate the projected shortfall between members
of different age cohorts, or to estimate directly how any such cohort fares overall under
government fiscal policy. They would require additional specification, however,
concerning both their computation and their use.
Conclusion 8: Generational accounting computations suggest that modern fiscal
policy generally has transferred wealth from younger to older Americans, and will
continue to do so under its present course. Lifetime net tax rates (in terms of lifetime
income) have risen fairly steadily throughout the twentieth century, and may, if present
policy continues, reach levels for future generations that seem severe and even
prohibitive. This raises concerns about both the intergenerational equity and the
sustainability of present policy.
One should keep in mind, however, the controversiality of the assumption, critically
underlying generational accounting’s results regarding future generations, that members
of such generations will have to pay off all public debt through tax increases. If public
debt can be retained indefinitely, and even grow at the same rate as the economy, then,
while permanently debt-financed government spending still has a cost to the society (if
only from its displacing alternative uses of the same resources, and requiring permanent
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payment of the interest charge), that cost need not have the intergenerational incidence
that generational accounting assumes. In effect, permanent debt-financing (at least if it
went to interest as well as principal on the national debt) would partly rehabilitate Abba
Lerner’s

“no-burden,

no-transfer”

claim.

In

evaluating

the

intergenerational

consequences of a permanently debt-financed expenditure relative to not engaging in the
expenditure, only the benefits and burdens of the government’s use of the resources,
relative to the alternative uses that are foregone, would have intergenerational
consequences. (Lerner would still be wrong, however, in viewing debt financing and tax
financing of the expenditure as equivalent, and perhaps in attributing it particularly to
present generations, given that it will also affect the resources that are left for future
generations.)
An additional quibble with the apparent implications of generational accounting goes
to the overall comparison between present and future generations. Before assuming that
future generations will be far worse off than ourselves unless fiscal policy changes, one
should keep in mind the possibility that per capita economic growth will render the debt
burden trivial. This happened in nineteenth century England, and conceivably could
happen again—whether or not we ought to rely, like Dickens’ Mr. Micawber, on the
hope that something will “turn up.”
The analysis thus far has mainly been positive, rather than normative. We next should
ask, however, how we want fiscal policy to affect the lifetime consumption of different
generations. What is the appropriate intergenerational fiscal policy? Only one contender
has been mentioned thus far: Laurence Kotlikoff’s proposed norm of generational
balance, defined as avoiding intergenerational wealth transfers through government fiscal
policy, or alternatively as equalizing different generations’ lifetime net tax rates. I
therefore will begin the normative analysis, in the next section, by assessing this
proposed norm.
III. A Fiscal Policy Norm of Generational Balance?
Kotlikoff does little to defend or even explain the norm of generational balance under
either of its alternative definitions. Nor does he explain the reason for changing its
definition from avoiding wealth transfers to equalizing lifetime net tax rates. The choice
of appropriate norm also has received little attention in the early literature responding to
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generational accounting, which focuses mainly on its merits as a system of measurement.
One can nonetheless infer and develop rationales for the proposed norm.
Kotlikoff’s two definitions of generational equity lead to different results. Suppose,
for example, that there are two generations, each containing the same number of
individuals. The average member of Generation 1 has lifetime income of $100, pays
taxes in the amount of $40, and receives a $15 transfer payment from the government
(financed by members of Generation 2). Thus, his net tax payment is $25, and his
lifetime net tax rate is 25 percent. The average member of Generation 2 has lifetime
income of $200, pays taxes in the amount of $45 (including the $15 paid to members of
Generation 1), and receives no transfer payments from the government. Thus, his net tax
payment is $45, and his lifetime net tax rate is 22.5 percent. Under Kotlikoff’s no-transfer
definition, Generation 1 has been treated better than Generation 2. Under his net tax rate
definition, Generation 2 has been treated better than Generation 1.
On its face, Kotlikoff’s more recent reliance on lifetime net tax rates seems to
represent a shift from the no-transfer principle to something derived from the standard tax
policy norm of horizontal equity, or treating alike (by taxing at the same rate) persons
who are deemed relevantly equal. As we will see, this shift conceivably might not be
intended or necessary: the lifetime net tax rate approach may simply provide a less direct,
but more workable, means of detecting intergenerational wealth transfers through
government fiscal policy. I will start, however, by assuming that this is not the case, and
that horizontal equity is an ostensible ground for equalizing different generations’
lifetime net tax rates.
A. Does Horizontal Equity Support Equalizing Different Generations’ Lifetime Net Tax
Rates?
The argument that a principle of horizontal equity, or equal treatment of equals,
requires applying the same lifetime net tax rate to average members of different
generations depends upon a number of narrower claims. Even apart from those going to
why horizontal equity is important, and to how one should measure equal treatment, the
argument relies on asserting both (1) that members of a single generation are sufficiently
alike that one should group them together for purposes of determining the effect of
government fiscal policy on an average member of the group, and (2) that members of
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different generations, while not appropriately grouped together, are equals in a morally
relevant sense. In Generational Accounting, Kotlikoff defends only the first of these two
claims. He states that generational groupings make sense because people born at around
the same time tend to act more alike than people born at very different times, reflecting
their degrees of common experience.1 This point has more obvious relevance to using
generational groupings for purposes of predicting the effects of government policy, than
for purposes of measuring equity.
Suppose, however, that we accept generational groupings and average-member
comparisons for purposes of measuring horizontal equity. An additional preliminary
problem worth noting is the horizontal equity standard’s normative controversiality in the
recent public finance literature. Louis Kaplow argues that, to the extent horizontal equity
is given independent significance, it conflicts with predominant utilitarian and social
welfare norms—for example, because it can indicate reducing overall welfare, as in the
case where, since A is being treated better than B but ought to be treated the same, it
supports treating A worse even if B does not benefit from the change.2
Even if one accepts the principle of horizontal equity, however, its capacity to
support equalizing lifetime net tax rates in the intergenerational setting is extremely
weak. For one thing, why should one regard the members of different generations as
relevantly alike? In the tax policy literature, likeness often is thought to depend on the
amount of one’s income or consumption. Such an assumption seems implicit in
generational accounting’s lifetime net tax rate computation, which uses lifetime income
as the denominator. Many, perhaps most, tax writers regard horizontal equity as
consistent with applying different tax rates to people whose incomes (or consumption
levels) differ. Comparisons between persons at different levels therefore are said to
require consulting the far less determinate standard of vertical equity, or appropriate
differential treatment of those who differ in their relevant attributes. Anyone who
1 Laurence Kotlikoff, Generational Accounting (1992) at 107-108.
2 Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 Nat’l Tax J. 139 (1990).
Much of Kaplow’s analysis is irrelevant here because he mainly addresses a technical definition of
horizontal equity, derived from efforts in the public finance literature to make it operational, as requiring
that a change in the tax system not cause two individuals to have different utilities if but for the change
they would have the same utility. Id. at 140 (quoting Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J.
Pub. Econ. 77 (1976)). In the inter-generational context, horizontal equity, as a basis for equalizing lifetime
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supports any degree of rate progressivity in the income tax system should reject the claim
that, in the intergenerational setting, horizontal equity requires equalizing lifetime net tax
rates—unless one expects lifetime income henceforth to be constant over time, in
contrast to its long-standing historical trend of steady increase.
Suppose, however, that one rejects rate progressivity. Even so, the principle that
equals should be treated equally fails to support equalizing different generations’ lifetime
net tax rates. In other writing, I have noted that, when horizontal equity is evaluated by
looking only at a subset of the government’s actions, it “suffers from ineradicable
second-best problems. Where the treatment of two individuals may differ in numerous
respects, equalizing how they are treated under one set of government rules does not
necessarily have any tendency to equalize their treatment by the government overall, and
may as plausibly reduce overall equality of treatment.”3 This criticism may seem less
relevant to generational accounting than to income taxation, since the former captures a
broader subset of government rules, by looking in full at both the tax and transfer sides.
Still, generational accounting fails to consider (1) benefit from the non-cash goods and
services that the government provides, (2) detriment such as regulatory burden, (3) the
behavioral effects on private saving of particular taxes, such as the claimed tendency of
income and estate taxation to reduce saving to the detriment of future generations, and
(4) non-cash contributions to the government, such as conscripted military service. The
significance of these items may vary sharply over time, for such reasons as the historical
growth of government, the sporadic nature of our foreign wars (and use of the military
draft), and the existence of regulatory legislation (such as the Age Discrimination Act)
that may have highly disparate effects across age cohorts.
Conceivably, however, support for equalizing lifetime net tax rates need not depend
upon the norm of horizontal equity. It may instead be an indirect means of implementing
the no-transfer norm for intergenerational fiscal policy that Kotlikoff states elsewhere in
his work. To illustrate, consider two generations that do not overlap at all. Suppose that
one generation, born in 1800, had a lifetime net tax rate of 10 percent, while another
generation, born in 1950, is expected to have a lifetime net tax rate in excess of 30
net tax rates, would focus on individuals’ loss of utility by reason of the total effects of government fiscal
policy ought to be the same, rather than starting from some norm of how it previously treated them.
3 Daniel Shaviro, Commentary: Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 Tax L. Rev. 393 (1993).
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percent. The claim that the 1950 age cohort has been treated inequitably relative to the
1800 age cohort would appear implausible. Even if we mistakenly assume that the two
age cohorts received government services of equal value—and thus that the 1950
generation truly did worse, in its relations with the government, than the 1800
generation—the two sets of lifetime net taxes reflected wholly separate sets of political
decisions made by wholly different people at wholly different times, with no direct interaction. Thus, even if the 1800 group fared better than the 1950 group (at least in its fiscal
transactions with the government), this seems irrelevant to equity. Similarly, one would
term it merely unfortunate, not unfair, that modern generations have the polio vaccine
and earlier generations did not.
Kotlikoff, however, is concerned with overlapping generations, which are the only
ones that can directly affect each other’s wealth through transactions involving cash or
other financial assets. Within overlapping generations, lifetime net tax rates may be
thought relevant as indicators of intergenerational wealth transfer. Suppose, for example,
that people born in 1980 pay net taxes at a far higher lifetime rate than people born in
1950. Not only may this reflect the direct political influence, during both groups’ shared
lifetimes, of the older group, but it is plausible that the government goods and services
received by members of the two generations were comparable in value. Thus, one could
view the imposition of unequal tax rates as evidencing (although of course not proving)
the occurrence of a wealth transfer from the younger to the older age cohort.
One might ask why not look more directly for evidence of intergenerational wealth
transfer, such as the direct transfer of specific Social Security contributions that were
made by members of one group into the pockets of members of the other group. The
answer is that such an inquiry would fail to provide useful information, given not only
the practical difficulty, in many cases, of tracing the exact flow of cash paid to the
government, but the substantive irrelevance of any such tracing. Recall the hypothetical
involving Generations 1 and 2, but this time with a purely formal change. Suppose that
the average member of Generation 1 paid $25 of gross, as well as net, tax, rather than
separately paying $40 and receiving $15. In addition, suppose that Generation 2’s tax
bills remained unchanged, since the last $15 per person, while no longer being
transferred directly to members of Generation 1, now was needed to replace the lost gross
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tax revenues therefrom. The effects would be the same as in the original version of the
hypothetical, but now there would be no discernible direct transfer of cash.
Accordingly, it seems plausible that a no-transfer norm for the intergenerational
effects of government fiscal policy can only be applied indirectly, perhaps by attempting
to equalize lifetime net tax rates (at least on a going forward basis) as between
overlapping generations. Is such a norm more persuasive than that of horizontal equity
between generations? The next section examines this question.
B. A No-Transfer Norm for the Intergenerational Effects of Government Fiscal Policy?
A no-transfer norm for intergenerational fiscal policy is considerably more
controversial than it may initially sound. It goes well beyond merely opposing rate
progressivity, since even a flat rate income tax is redistributive if those with higher
incomes (and therefore greater tax liabilities) do not receive commensurately greater
benefits from government spending. Beyond being controversial, however, the notransfer norm can be criticized as both arbitrary and incoherent—perhaps in general, but
certainly as applied to intergenerational fiscal policy.
Writers such as Cass Sunstein argue that a no-transfer norm is inherently arbitrary
because it treats as a conceptual baseline the “pre-political” distribution of wealth that
would prevail absent whichever proposed government policy one is considering.
Sunstein’s argument is twofold. First, the no-transfer norm seems to require assuming the
prevailing distribution’s superiority to any other. Second, given the pervasive effects of
government on all private activity and wealth—not only through explicitly redistributive
programs, but in light of such core functions as protecting private property—the notransfer norm is incoherent. There is no inherently correct starting point to treat as a
baseline; the implicitly assumed pre-political distribution does not exist to begin with.4
In some contexts, one could respond to Sunstein by noting other possible grounds for
a no-transfer norm. Notwithstanding that all distributions are inherently political, and that
the prevailing distribution need not be the best possible one, one could argue, in some
circumstances, that a no-transfer norm tends to promote efficiency in the sense of societal
wealth maximization. Redistribution tends to be costly, due not only to its transaction
costs and effects on incentives, but to its encouraging the range of socially non4 Cf. Cass Sunstein, [any article on the baseline pt].
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productive activities, designed to procure or resist wealth transfers, that the public choice
literature calls “rent-seeking.”
For purposes of assessing intergenerational fiscal policy, while this debate is worth
noting—since it shows the inherent controversiality of a no-transfer norm—one need not
resolve it. The no-transfer norm, even if persuasive in other contexts, is peculiarly
artificial and question-begging here. What makes it so is the pervasiveness of transfers
between members of different generations, acting outside the realm of government fiscal
policy. Ordinarily, when one is comparing two groups—say, the rich and the poor, or
urban and rural Americans—one can assume that there will be a relative paucity of
gratuitous transfers between the groups. Exchange transactions would be the expected
norm. Thus, without absurdity, one can isolate for analysis a proposed wealth transfer
between the groups—although, to be sure, there is always the argument that a seeming
transfer from Group A to Group B merely reverses a preexisting separate transfer from
Group B to Group A. The claim that government fiscal policy favors one group at
another’s expense is not inherently insignificant.
A comparison of overlapping generations, for purposes of assessing government
fiscal policy, is considerably different. Even accepting that fiscal policy has
intergenerational consequences, given the incompleteness of Ricardian offsets, a notransfer norm appears strangely blinkered and formalistic given all the other gratuitous
transfers between the generations that continually are taking place. Why care about one
particular route of accomplishing something that is pervasive, and that mostly goes in the
opposite direction, or from older to younger generations?
The existence of bequests and inter vivos gifts of cash or property is only a small part
of the broader picture—traditionally emphasized because it is the part most obviously
subject to Ricardian adjustment. Consider that numerous members of older generations
devote enormous resources—above all, their own personal efforts as parents—to support
and train for adulthood the members of younger generations. Every diaper changed,
every moment spent driving one’s children to school, could be termed, in a sense, an
intergenerational transfer.
Yet even the transfers within a single household capture only a portion of the whole.
Consider the occurrence throughout the society as a whole of net capital formation, or the
increase over time in net social resources, generally due to saving and productive
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investment. Or consider the fact that at no time (as yet) have living generations wholly
depleted or degraded existing real resources, either man-made or natural, despite by now
possessing the physical power to do so. Resource non-depletion, and beyond that net
capital formation, depend in large part on the willingness (whether or not altruistically
motivated) of members of present generations to forego consumption during their
lifetimes, to the potential benefit of their descendants. Such decisions are functionally
equivalent to transfers to future generations, even if the word “transfer” seems inapposite
given its implication that everything now available is rightfully ours to dispose of as we
wish. A “transfer,” for thus purpose, need only mean a decision not to allocate wholly to
oneself a resource that is subject to one’s physical power.
Transfers (in this or the more usual sense) from present to future generations through
resource non-depletion and net capital formation are so huge that the notion of requiring
balance in the narrow area of government fiscal policy seems hopelessly naive. A
requirement of balance might also be contrary to all generations’ preferences. Suppose,
for example, that people care about future generations, due not only to altruism within the
household, but to a patriotic interest in the future wealth and strength of the United States
as a whole. Increased saving by any one person to increase our future wealth and strength
would be subject to collective action problems if others, despite being like-minded,
declined to engage in it because they realized that their own individual contributions
would make so little difference at the margin. One way to solve this collective action
problem is to have government fiscal policy stimulate increased saving, by using budget
surpluses to transfer lifetime consumption from present to future generations.
Alternatively, suppose, as Allan Drazen has posited, that parents would increase their
investments in their children’s education, given the enormous return that such investment
may yield in the form of increased future earnings, but for the difficulty of ensuring that
the children will share the benefits with them. One cannot, after all, create a legally
enforceable debt running from one’s minor children to oneself (repayable at adulthood),
or require them to repay one’s debts at death, or, as a practical matter, even borrow
against their expected future earnings. Due to these imperfections in capital markets, a
selfish parent might decline, say, to borrow for a child’s education at 8 percent for a
return of 20 percent, absent any mechanism for making the child share this return. Debtfinanced government spending for education, to be repaid when the children are
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taxpaying adults, has the potential to correct this gap in the capital markets, and thus to
benefit members of both generations despite its violating the no-transfer norm.5 Under
the right conditions, therefore, all generations would reject the norm of generational
balance, and instead support the use of government fiscal policy to transfer money from
younger to older generations.
A final set of objections to the norm of generational balance is brought to mind by the
age group literature, which employs a snapshot perspective to examine how the currently
young and elderly have been treated by government fiscal policy, and more broadly have
fared economically, over time. Recent studies suggest that poverty rates among the
elderly have been declining since 1939, but particularly since 1969, mainly due to
changes in government tax and transfer policy; and that poverty rates among children
declined from 1939 to 1969 but have been increasing since that time, mainly due to
changes in parents’ earnings. On a per capita basis, federal spending on the elderly
exceeds that on children and youth by a ratio of more than three to one.6
This literature, while consistent in broad outline with the empirical findings of
generational accounting, brings to mind two challenges to the proposed norm of
generational balance. First, where broader social changes occur (such as declining
parental earnings), the vision of equity that appears to underlie the norm might be better
served by slanting the generational effects of fiscal policy so as to offset the effects (if
undesirable) of these changes. Second, changes in the treatment of people currently
belonging to different age groups may be desirable even if, as a transitional matter, such
change violates generational balance by yielding windfall winners and losers. In the
1930s, for example, the enactment of Social Security reflected a deliberate decision to
benefit the elderly, on the ground that they were past their prime earning years and thus
could not be expected to escape poverty. More recently, the view has spread that we need
to focus on helping children, both because they may be helpless (especially given the
weakening of the traditional family) and because the long earning years that potentially
lie ahead of them make them a better “investment” by society. One could argue that
5 See Allan Drazen, Government Debt, Human Capital, and Bequests in a Life-Cycle Model, 86 J. Pol.
Econ. 505 (1978).
6 Stephen Crystal, America’s Old Age Crisis: Public Policy and the Two Worlds of Aging (NY: Basic
Books 1982) at 5.
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neither of these two views ought to have been rejected simply due to the transitional
effects on lifetime outcomes for different age cohorts.
Against all these weighty objections to the norm of generational balance, only one
good argument weighs strongly in favor of it. Such balance may be the approach best
suited to minimize fiscal illusion, and thereby enable members of present generations to
achieve the desired relationship between their own consumption and the consumption
opportunities that they make available to their heirs through bequests or otherwise. Even
Ricardians, who necessarily reject fiscal illusion, might concede that a policy of
generational balance could lower the cost of making an accurate long-term assessment.
This argument is far from trivial if one believes that, as a result of fiscal illusion,
present generations are saving too little relative to their own intergenerational
preferences. It would imply that both present and future generations suffer when
generational policy is imbalanced. The former fail to accomplish their own objectives—
although they may never learn that they have left their descendants less than they intended. The latter end up receiving smaller net bequests than they would have had their
forebears correctly understood the effects of government policy.
Nonetheless, the argument seems to fall short of establishing that a norm of
generational balance should be adopted despite its many problems and limitations.
Alternative and less sweeping responses to the fiscal illusion problem are possible. One
such response would be simply attempting to promote greater public understanding and
debate regarding the intergenerational consequences of government policy. A second
possibility would be to seek to encourage saving and investment by any means apart from
changing present generations’ preferences. Examples could include improving the tax
treatment of saving and investment relative to immediate consumption, or changing
government spending to place greater emphasis on long-term investment.
Moreover, at bottom the fiscal illusion argument relies on a claim of harm to present,
rather than future, generations. Although future generations are harmed if present ones
mistakenly save too little, only the departure from what present generations ostensibly
really want makes this appear unambiguously bad, rather than a potentially indeterminate
tradeoff. Accordingly, the argument is not really intergenerational, but rather holds that
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national saving is too low from the perspective of present generations. Accordingly,
while it merits consideration, it is not within the scope of this particular article.7
C. Developing Alternatives to the Unpersuasive Horizontal Equity and No-Transfer
Norms
If both horizontal equity and the no-transfer norm for government fiscal policy are
unpersuasive, where does this leave the analysis? The immensity of transfers (broadly
conceived) from present to future generations does not necessarily imply that we are
entitled to get something back through government fiscal policy. We obviously owe
everything, even our existence, to past generations that similarly made transfers to us.
The point, rather, is that government fiscal policy is only one integral part of a larger
whole. What matters, for purposes of determining the allocation of consumption between
present and future generations, is the overall rate of saving and net capital formation,
taking account of human capital formation and our treatment of depletable or degradable
resources. This, in turn, invites normative inquiry regarding the appropriate overall
behavior of present generations relative to prospective future generations.
Such an inquiry is facilitated by the existence of a rich economic and philosophical
literature on issues of intergenerational equity. An oft-quoted starting point for
considering the claims of future on current generations is Edmund Burke’s famous
statement that the state is a partnership among all members of the society, and that, “[a]s
the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a
partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living,
those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state
is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society.”8 This view states our
obligation towards future generations in the strongest possible terms, yet arguably
diminishes its independent importance, by placing it in a broader framework of stasis,
continuity, and equal obligation to the past and its traditions. Implicitly, our descendants
7 I discuss the claim that budget deficits may cause national saving to be too low from the perspective
of present generations, on grounds that include fiscal illusion, in Chapter VI.C. of my forthcoming book,
The Political Economy of Budget Deficits. I conclude that one can make a modest case for seeking to
increase national saving, but that deficit reduction is only one possible means of doing so, and would be at
least partly self-defeating as a means to the extent that it involved increasing the tendency of income
taxation to discourage saving, or reducing valuable long-term investment by the government.
8 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France.
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will be much like us, and will not need more or different goods and institutions than
those that we have. Burke also does not have strongly in mind the pang of a choice
between, say, relieving poverty today and enriching society in the long run.
A less frequently quoted, but American, starting point is provided by Thomas
Jefferson’s claim that, because “the earth belongs always to the living generation,” no
generation should be able to bind its successors in any way—not to observe the same
constitution and laws, and not even to repay private or public debts. While Jefferson’s
view could not possibly be more opposite to Burke’s, both in principle and as applied to
social and legal traditions, its implications for public debt can be interpreted as
surprisingly consistent. Burke’s contract view can be interpreted to imply a norm of
reciprocity and symmetry between the generations (although he focuses more on
continuity). Jefferson’s no-debt view provides one possible means of applying such a
norm, although other possible applications of the norm, such as keeping the national debt
constant either in absolute terms or relative to some variable such as national income or
wealth, would be inconsistent with Jefferson’s position.
Jefferson’s view has stood the test of time considerably worse than Burke’s. After
two centuries of armed revolutions less benign than our own, the notion that one can
reinvent civil society every twenty years seems neither realistic nor attractive. Moreover,
past generations cannot help fundamentally shaping the world in which future ones come
to live, no matter how hard they try to avoid doing so (and there is no reason to believe
they do try). Thus, a norm of total autonomy for each generation is implausible. At best,
as James Madison recognized when he replied to Jefferson that future generations could
rightfully be asked to inherit obligations alongside benefits, the underlying intuition
decomposes into the norm of generational balance.
However, Burke’s view has suffered over time as well, although, as we will see, it
retains adherents. In the twentieth century, the worldwide pace of technological, political,
and cultural change—along, perhaps, with a greater historical understanding of the pace
of change even in the past—has tended to discredit Burke’s belief in continuity,
suggesting that our descendants may live (if at all) as very different people in a very
different world.
The rapid pace of contemporary change has helped to stimulate two separate stages in
the development of the intergenerational literature. First, since the 1920s, welfare
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economists have addressed the question of how to determine the optimal rate of saving,
given saving’s effect on the relative material well-being of present and future
generations. Second, in philosophy, a new genre of examining intergenerational justice
emerged in the 1970s, largely in response to widespread fears that mankind is degrading
the global environment and depleting the Earth’s finite resources. The fear of collective
catastrophe and potential species extinction, newly generalized beyond the threat of
nuclear war, encouraged philosophers to examine the moral claims of persons who do not
now exist, may never exist, and whose identities as individuals (if they come to exist)
will depend on inherently unpredictable future happenstance, such as the fortuity of
which eggs, fertilized by which sperm, happen to develop into living people. Neither of
these two literatures has yet, to any significant degree, been brought to bear on the deficit
debate among economists.
If these literatures permit one to reach firm normative conclusions, then in principle
one could define, for any given moment, the optimal rate of saving. One could then, by
comparing the optimal and actual rates, determine whether present generations were
saving too much, too little, or just the right amount. This, in turn, could tell us what direction of change in government fiscal policy would bring us closer to the proper level.
Of course, even to speak of the “optimal rate of saving” is in a sense too narrow,
because it tends to downplay the level of human capital transfer, and perhaps factors such
as environmental degradation or depletion, or, for that matter, the threat of nuclear war. A
change in something like the divorce rate, given its well-documented effect on children’s
welfare, ought in principle to be part of the intergenerational analysis as well.
Moreover, once one recognizes this undue narrowness, one can begin to question (or
at least recognize the limitations of) the entire framework of analysis. For example, why
care about the timing of material consumption when there is so much doubt about its
relationship to actual subjective well-being? Are wealthier societies or individuals
generally or always happier than those less wealthy, who may live in totally different
circumstances and adjust to wholly different sets of expectations? How does one even
measure consumption, which economists have long recognized is “fundamentally . . . a
flow of satisfactions, of intangible psychological experiences?”9 Not even the person
9 Robert Haig, “The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects,” in R. Musgrave & C. Shoup
(eds.), Readings in the Economics of Taxation (1959) at 55.

20

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

having such experiences can quantify them. Using a single implicit metric, such as
“satisfaction,” may be inaccurate, and at best a convenient organizing metaphor.
The economist’s familiar tool of revealed preferences provides no help in this regard.
It also is useless in distinguishing between consumption and saving, since that distinction
turns on the actor’s motive, or on the timing of the actual or expected return from what
one chooses to do. If I change my child’s diaper instead of watching television, then,
while tautologically I have done what I preferred, it does not follow that I have
maximized present consumption. I may have subjected both my child and myself to a few
unpleasant moments because I think that our increased satisfaction tomorrow, when he
does not have diaper rash, will exceed our mutual disgruntlement today. Yet how does
one distinguish this from the possibility that I am acting to minimize my pangs of
conscience today?
In the multigenerational household context, identifying the incidence of benefit is no
easier than specifying its timing. Evolution has equipped parents with a measure of
altruistic empathy for their children’s pleasures and pains, and children with a talent for
nudging the parents in this direction, if necessary. Even the core decision to have children
resists classification. As a recent study notes:
[F]rom the viewpoint of parents, children are themselves akin to
consumer goods. Most parents have children because they want them,
and they want children even though they know that children are expensive and present problems in other ways. If adults choose to spend their
money on children rather than on steak, this may be because they find
eating hamburger with their children more satisfying than eating steak
alone. It is not obvious, therefore, that having children makes adults
worse off in any meaningful sense, even if it reduces their consumption
of “luxury” goods, reduces a previously two-earner family to a oneearner one with less income, and increases the fraction of their income
that they allocate to “necessities.”10
The incidence and timing of benefit may resist easy classification even outside the
household context. What looks mainly like investment may really (or also) be
consumption. Consider a costly weapons development program in the “Star Wars” genre
that, if likely to be ineffective, serves mainly as a source of national pride, or else to
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affect rival countries’ current policy choices if they overestimate its prospects. Likewise,
what looks like consumption may also be investment. Consider, for example, a
government program that provides free meals to schoolchildren. While the program
subsidizes current consumption, one could plausibly, under appropriate circumstances,
term it an investment in human capital. Or consider a program of wealth redistribution
among members of living generations. While the program presumably would increase
current consumption as conventionally measured, given poor people’s generally greater
marginal propensity to consume, it might, if successful in reducing poverty, permit some
individuals to live longer and more productive lives.
The only way to defend the myopic conventions that underlie a standard examination
of the optimal rate of saving is to argue, not only that a more sophisticated analysis
would be difficult or impossible, but that the standard analysis does well enough to merit
attention. While this is unprovable, surely people often act as if they believe that wealth
and material consumption tend to correlate with happiness, and view the decision
whether to spend money now or later as a choice of when to consume. Moreover, the
broad human capital, sociological, and environmental factors that may reduce one’s
confidence in the standard analysis may tend to be less important in assessing the timing
of taxation relative to government spending than for many other purposes. One may
therefore be justified, for purposes of the present analysis, in reluctantly leaving the
broader methodological problems to one side. With that in mind, I will turn now to the
questions that ought to replace norms of horizontal equity and generational balance in
evaluating the appropriateness of present fiscal policy: how does one evaluate the optimal
rate of saving, and where do we presently stand (considering both current fiscal policy
and everything else that we do) in relation to it?

10 John L. Palmer, Timothy Smeeding, & Christopher Jencks, “The Uses and Limits of Income
Comparisons,” in Palmer, Smeeding, & Barbara Boyle Torrey (eds.), The Vulnerable (Washington, D.C.:
Urban Institute Press 1988), at 19.
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IV. Is the Current Rate of Saving (Including the Effects of Government Fiscal Policy)
Too Low from the Perspective of Future Generations?
A. Defining the Problem
One often hears the complaint that people in the United States are saving too little,
both individually and collectively. For example, the economist Benjamin Friedman, in
Day Of Reckoning, a work for a popular audience that denounces deficits, compares us to
a man on a binge who asks why it matters? Flush with cash from
liquidating his modest investment portfolio and from taking out a second
mortgage on the inflated value of his house, he can spend seemingly
without limit. The vacation cruise his family has dreamed about for
years, the foreign sports car he has always wanted, new designer clothes
for his wife and even his children, meals in all the most expensive
restaurants—life is wonderful. What difference does it make if he has to
pay some interest [and ultimately liquidate the rest of his assets]? . . . .
[But] Americans have traditionally confronted such questions in the
context of certain values, values that arise from the obligation that one
generation owes to the next.11
As Friedman emphasizes, the main implications of a claim that we save too little are
intergenerational. To be sure, the claim has some relevance for present generations as
well, even under the assumption that people generally do what is best for themselves. The
low national saving rate may depart from our preferences or true interests on a number of
different grounds. We may be subject to fiscal illusion, causing us to overlook the effects
of government fiscal policy on national saving. Or certain government policies, such as
the use of an income tax that discourages saving relative to current consumption,12 may
distort our behavior. Or saving may be reduced by an externality problem, if, as is
commonly asserted (although with little hard evidence), the social return to investment
exceeds the private return due to factors such as increased economies of scale as the size
11 Benjamin Friedman, Day of Reckoning: The Consequences of American Economic Policy Under
Reagan and After (New York: Random House 1988) at 3.
12 By taxing returns to investment if one saves, but not reaching the psychic benefit of avoided
impatience if one currently consumes, the income tax distorts the choice between current and future
consumption by increasing the relative attractiveness of the former. See Daniel Shaviro, An Efficiency
Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 Tax L.Rev. 1, 9 n. 29
(1992).
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of the national economy grows.13 Or the externality problem may relate to a collective
interest in maintaining or increasing the United States’ relative economic (and thus
presumably political and military) power in the world.
Despite these intragenerational arguments, however, the primary implications of a
claim that we collectively save too little are intergenerational, for two reasons. First,
notwithstanding all of the above, there is a difference between what we do to ourselves
and what we do to others who cannot affect our behavior because they have not yet been
born. Second, an unduly low national saving rate, to the extent that it reduced the rate of
growth in overall societal wealth, would affect our descendants more than ourselves in
view of the long time lag that is needed for it to have a significant impact. Suppose, for
example, that per-capita gdp grew each year by 3 percent, rather than 4 percent, owing to
insufficient saving. Five years from now, per-capita gdp would still be more than 95
percent of what it “ought” to have been had we saved more. Fifty years from now, it
would be just over 60 percent of what it “ought” to have been.
So far, while agreeing with Benjamin Friedman that the main implications of his
claim that we are saving too little are inter-generational, I have not questioned his claim
itself. Yet such a normative claim plainly requires explicit justification. Friedman,
perhaps sensing the deep waters into which attempting to establish it would drag him, or
else because Day of Reckoning is written for a popular audience, over-simplifies the issue
by arguing from an inapt analogy. His man on a binge is dissaving, and thereby
dissipating his wealth—not merely saving too little and thereby increasing his wealth too
slowly. The United States, by contrast, still has a positive saving rate and gdp that is
growing in real terms.
The one thing that is fairly clear in support of Friedman’s claim is that the current
national saving rate in the United States is unusually low, by both international and our
own historical standards. Since around 1980, the national saving rate in the United States
has generally been last, and always at least close to last, among major industrialized
nations. After averaging 7.1 percent in the 1970s, it has averaged only 3 percent since
1980, and stood at only 1.7 percent in 1993. While this partly reflects the growth in
federal budget deficits, which count, for purposes of the measure, as public dissaving, it
13 See William D. Nordhaus, What’s Wrong with a Declining National Saving Rate?, 32 Challenge
22, 24 (July-August 1989) (noting the appeal, but lack of evidence, for this claim).
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also reflects a decline in the private rate of saving, from 8.1 percent for the 1970s to a
low of 4.5 percent in 1989, albeit with a more recent increase to 6.3 percent.14
Some view these official figures as arbitrary and noneconomic. David Bradford has
recently revived the argument that the conventional measure of national saving is
inadequate because—much like the budget deficit—it applies accounting conventions
such as historical cost, rather than looking at real economic values. Bradford proposes
instead to define the national saving rate as the change in market value of net national
wealth per capita.15
For some purposes, such as determining how people’s material well-being is
changing over time, Bradford’s measure plainly is more informative than the
conventional one—although ephemeral fluctuations in such items as stock market and
real estate prices may create a degree of “noise.” However, for the purpose of examining
behavior at the decisional margin between consuming and investing, one could argue that
his proposal is inapposite. By providing a current market value measure of the results of
people’s decisions, as measured in present market value terms, he does not distinguish
between the amount invested and investment outcomes. Suppose, for example, that
productivity growth declined because, despite a constant rate of scientific research, no
powerful new technologies had recently been discovered or brought into general use.
Bradford’s measure would treat this as a decline in saving, which would say something
accurate about the results, but not about the underlying behavior that contributed to the
results.
Accordingly, the conventional measure of national saving seems preferable to
Bradford’s for the narrow purpose of determining whether Americans have become less
prone to defer consumption. However, even if one preferred Bradford’s measure for this
purpose, one’s conclusions regarding the trend in national saving might not change
significantly. As one would expect given his measure’s reliance on volatile short-term
phenomena such as the level of stock market prices, his figures show greater fluctuation
in the national saving rate from year to year. They do, however, suggest an overall longterm decline in the national saving rate (again, defined as per capita wealth
14 Wang Nan, “Why Americans Don’t Save,” Xinhua News Agency, 6/ 17/94.

Budget Deficits

25

accumulation). Additional research would be needed to confirm that the national saving
rate, in Bradford’s sense, is also low relative to that in other industrialized nations.
In sum, Benjamin Friedman’s core empirical claim that the present national saving
rate in the United States is unusually low probably can be accepted. Still, however, even
if our present collective behavior is unusual, no normative implications need follow.
Perhaps other societies, including the United States in the past, save excessively, or
simply have different tastes. Or perhaps at present we have good reason to save less—for
example, because the size and vigor of our economy, and the stability of our political
institutions, make it relatively easy for us to attract foreign investment.
A low rate of saving tends to slow economic growth and the upward path of
productivity. Even if a reasonable level of domestic investment is sustained by foreign
investment, the profits presumably will inure to foreigners, thus reducing, although not
eliminating, domestic benefit from the foreign investment. Short of dissaving, however, a
low national saving rate does not create any inherent sustainability problem for the
present level of consumption. While obviously a higher growth rate is preferable if all
else is equal, all else is not equal given the general tradeoff between current consumption
and saving for future consumption. Surely we are not obligated to live like hermits,
toiling unceasingly so that future generations can live a lot better than us, any more than,
at the other extreme, we should make no provision for the future at all. Rather, in
principle there is an optimal rate of saving, perhaps varying with the context, that would
lead to the optimal allocation of consumption (however one defines optimality) between
present and future generations. One needs to know something about the optimal rate of
saving before one can conclude that the actual saving rate is either too high or too low,
and therefore whether the effect of deficits on national saving is good, bad, or indifferent.
Unfortunately, as Amartya Sen commented more than thirty years ago, “the search
for the ‘optimum’ rate of saving has not yet been vastly more successful than that for the
holy grail.”16 John Rawls agrees that it “seems to admit of no definite answer.”17 E.J.
Mishan notes that, while a number of well-developed economic models purport to
15 David F. Bradford, “Market Value versus Financial Accounting Measires of National Saving,” in
B. Douglas Bernheim & John B. Shoven (eds.), National Saving and Economic Performance (Chicago: U.
of Chicago Press 1991), at 15-44.
16 Amartya Sen, On Optimising the Rate of Saving, 71 Economic Journal 479 (1961).
17 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press 1971) at 286.
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determine the appropriate rate of economic growth (permitting one to deduce the optimal
rate of saving, with the help of additional information), “the models are ‘cooked up’ so as
to give the imprimatur of science to what is, after all, no more than a popular ethical
judgement.”18 Mishan attributes this failing less to the particular economists who have
designed the models than to the inherently limited capacity of economics, as a discipline,
to derive strong welfare conclusions about complex social issues from its conventional
starting point of revealed preferences.
The problems in determining the optimal rate of saving are both empirical and
philosophical. As examples of the former, what real growth rate should we expect from
our saving, and how well off will our descendants otherwise be relative to us? Real
growth rates in the United States economy have varied substantially over time, and conceivably could vary still more in the future. Are we on the verge of an unprecedented
technology-fueled wealth explosion? Might we instead be approaching reversal of the
centuries-old trend of generally steady growth, under the strains of an aging population,
overall population growth, environmental disasters, and growing resource shortages?
Might we even be approaching a catastrophe, caused by war or environmental and
demographic strains, such that significant saving for the future serves little purpose?
While such questions are close to unanswerable, the philosophical issues are no
easier. As Jan Narveson puts it, answers to the question of what we are morally obligated
to do for future generations “range all the way from Nothing to Everything—which
would be no cause for alarm, except that both answers, and some in between, have
rational support.”19 Do we owe future generations everything? Rawls argues that this
could follow logically from utilitarianism if one prefers to maximize aggregate rather
than average happiness, allows no time discount for future relative to current
consumption, and assumes that future generations, in the aggregate, will be far more
numerous than ourselves.20 Or one could posit that parents have a duty to treat their
children’s well-being as more important than their own. Alternatively, do we owe future
18 E.J. Mishan, Economic Criteria for Intergenerational Comparisons, in Futures (October 1977) at
383.
19 Jan Narveson, “Future People and Us,” in R.I. Sikora & Brian Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future
Generations (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press 1978), at 38.
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generations nothing, because they have done nothing for us, and lack the moral status of
presently living individuals?21 Derek Parfit argues that we might owe them nothing
whenever our choices change the precise identity of who comes to be born. He notes that,
given the biological facts of human reproduction, including monthly ovulation of a
distinct egg, very little is needed for a collective social choice to bring about such
change. Those who would not have been born but for such choices ostensibly cannot
complain so long as they are glad, on balance, to be alive, and those who never come to
be born surely have no moral status.22 As an intermediate alternative to the positions
noted by Rawls and Parfit, is what we owe future generations a function of what past
generations have done for us? Benjamin Friedman asserts this, implicitly relying on
something like Edmund Burke’s view of an eternal chain-linked contractual partnership,
with or without its underlying religious aspect. Or does what we owe future generations
depend on satisfying John Locke’s proviso for the legitimacy of private property
acquisition: that there be “enough and as good left . . . for others”?23 The proviso’s
implications in the intergenerational context (as elsewhere) are subject to dispute.24
This only hints at the range of philosophical questions that can be (and have been)
asked in the intergenerational setting. Ought one to apply a social rate of discount,
treating future harms as less weighty than present ones? Or are a billion catastrophic
deaths in one hundred years, if certain to occur, as bad as a billion catastrophic deaths
today? If one adopts a utilitarian perspective, should one seek to maximize future
generations’ average happiness, or their aggregate happiness? As various philosophers
20 Rawls (1971) at 289. This assumes, perhaps unrealistically in some cases, that consumption is not
time-exclusive, and thus that my foregoing a unit of consumption will typically permit many successive
future people, not just one future person, to consume in my stead.
21 Jan Narveson notes that this arguably follows logically from viewing morality as based on at least
implicit contract between independent rational agents. Jan Narveson, “Future People and Us,” in R.I.
Sikora & Brian Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press 1978),
at 38.
22 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984).
23 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (Peter Laslett, ed.), 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press 1967) at section 27. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New Yotk: Basic Books
1974 at 174-182, for a discussion of Locke’s proviso as limiting (but not greatly) the right to private
property in a libertarian system.
24 Compare Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern (Oxford: Blackwell Press 1983) at
96 (arguing that Nozickean justice implies only minimal obligations towards future generations); with
Robert Elliot, Future Generations, Locke’s Proviso and Libertarian Justice, 3 J. Applied Phil. 217 (1986)
(arguing that Locke’s proviso, as interpreted by Nozick, may generate extensive obligations to future
generations).
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have noted, either definition seems to invite absurd consequences—such as killing
everyone but the happiest person (assuming he would not mind) under the former
definition, or massively increasing the human population to a Malthusian level of bare
sustenance under the latter. Is the norm of intergenerational justice simply incoherent, as
Terence Ball argues, on the ground that “justice” is a socially contingent concept which
future people are almost certain to view completely differently than we do?25 Ought we
instead to rely on our own norms, either because it does not matter whether they will be
held in the future or because one can assume relative continuity in the assessment of
questions of equitable distribution? Or ought we to hark back to Thomas Jefferson’s view
that, because “the earth belongs always to the living generation,” no generation ought to
attempt to bind its successors to any set of practices, whether those embodied in an
ongoing constitution or in the commitment to repay public debt?
While these are weighty questions on which reasonable people disagree, the choice of
standard is fundamental. For convenience, and because it fits my generally utilitarian
intuitions, I will adopt a modified version of John Rawls’ approach (albeit that Rawls
rejects utilitarianism). Rawls famously describes the original position, a hypothetical
state from which people decide on appropriate principles of justice, social institutions,
and the like, in light of the consequences that their choices will have, but behind a veil of
ignorance concerning who, and how fortunate, they will be in the resulting society.26
While the original position and veil of ignorance provide a useful heuristic, I reject
Rawls’ accompanying ad hoc assumption of apparently infinite risk aversion, which leads
him to derive a “maximin” principle, under which those making choices from the original
position would conclude that nothing matters but maximizing the well-being of the
worst-off person. The arbitrariness of this assumed extreme risk aversion can be shown in
many ways—for example, by asking whether in practice very many people would (or
should) sell a lottery ticket for $1 if it offers a 1 percent chance of no return and a 99
percent chance of earning a billion dollars. In the intergenerational setting, the
“maximin” principle has the peculiar implication—which Rawls steadfastly, but (as many
25 Terence Ball, The Incoherence of Intergenerational Justice, 28 Inquiry 321.(19__).
26 Rawls (1971) at 12.
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commentators agree) unconvincingly, denies—that no generation should save if, in
consequence, the next generation will be better off.27
In place of “maximin,” I will assume a general utilitarian norm, on the ground that a
decision-maker in the original position wants to maximize his likely well-being as a
randomly placed person, although perhaps subject to a more plausible level of risk
aversion. I will also assume that the Rawlsian decisionmakers know that we have gotten
to where we are today, rather than operating from the overly abstract original position.
The only remaining question for them to consider, asked from behind a veil of ignorance
regarding who one will be and when one will live (or even if one will live, compared to
other potential people), is what to do next.
However, I will ignore the difficult issue of population size, and thus of average
versus aggregate utility. This issue, in addition to being all but insoluble, is not directly
implicated by questions of the optimal saving rate and government fiscal policy, since the
causal linkages are unclear. Does a taste for increased saving correlate with people
having fewer children, so that they can spend less on current household consumption? Or
does it correlate with people having more children, because the greater wealth that it
gradually produces makes child-raising more affordable? Likewise, do larger budget
deficits, to the limited extent that they affect family planning, predominantly cause
people to have fewer children, so that their households’ likely shares of future taxes will
not increase, or more children, because paying less in current taxes tends to make one
feel wealthier?
Among the consequences of my choice of norm is that any Burkean claim that
explicitly or implicitly contractual reciprocity between generations is important as an end
in itself can be ignored. The same goes for the claim that parents have a duty to treat their
children’s well-being as more important than their own (rather than equally important).
While such claims cannot be disproven, at least if stated as first principles, they derive
from different moral premises than those I choose. On the same ground, one can
disregard Derek Parfit’s distinction between choices that change exactly who will be born
in the future and those that do not. The modified-Rawlsian approach also has the
27 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1980)
at 223-225 (criticizing Rawls’ rejection of this implication of maximin); R.H. Solow, Intergenerational
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consequence of eliminating the social discount rate as between present and future lives,
and suggesting that, say, severe material deprivation is equally regrettable whether it
occurs today or in five hundred years (assuming equal certainty of its occurrence).
Discounting is appropriate only within the same person’s life, since only then can one
imagine deferral as reducing the value of a satisfaction or the cost of a harm.
Even with these specifications, the analysis remains exceptionally complicated. For
example, even disregarding risk aversion, the modified-Rawlsian approach does not
support a norm of monetary wealth maximization, which might imply that present
generations should toil like slaves, consuming as little as possible, so that per capita
social wealth can grown as fast as possible. Given the generally declining marginal utility
of wealth, a present person does not necessarily increase aggregate well-being by
depriving himself of X units of consumption so that an already wealthier descendant can
enjoy X + Y units of consumption. The proper tradeoff between these two consumption
alternatives would be difficult to evaluate even if one could quantify X and Y (and the
wealth of the alternative consumers) in constant dollar terms.
One would like to find a short cut to avoid the many empirical and philosophical
imponderables. Three main possibilities come to mind. First, drawing on the economic
literature concerning growth, one could adopt a standard called dynamic efficiency,
which, as John Seater explains, “is a kind of Pareto optimality; an economy is dynamically efficient if it is not possible to improve one generation’s welfare without reducing
the welfare of another. In particular, an economy is dynamically inefficient if it has
overaccumulated capital”28 such that it could consume more without reducing future
generations’ consumption.
As Seater notes, we are far short of the dynamic inefficiency frontier, at which we
would self-defeatingly be saving too much.29 Thus, the standard’s only possible use lies
in asserting that changes in present behavior are undesirable unless they are Paretooptimal—which would seem to imply either that no change is allowed, or that we may
voluntarily decide to save more, on the ground that a voluntary act should generally be
assumed not to harm the actor, but that no particular obligation to do so exists. However,
Equity, 41 Rev. Econ. Studies 29 (1974) (developing an economic model that deduces a norm of equal
consumption by all generations from applying maximin).
28 Seater (1993) at 150 n. 12 (emphasis in original).
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the intergenerational setting is an unusual one for the Pareto standard, which generally
applies to transfers between parties that are more distinct in their interests than the
altruistically linked members of a single household. The Pareto standard also can be
criticized as a variant of the no-transfer norm that applies an undefended status quo bias,
and as inconsistent with the modified Rawlsian standard that I have adopted.
Second, one could try to reconcile the generations’ interests by treating living
people’s preferences as changeable. Suppose that the question one asked was whether it
would be better, from the modified-Rawlsian perspective, if present generations could be
induced to enjoy saving, and therefore to do so a lot. Such enjoyment might reflect the
influence of what Keynes called “pure miserliness, i.e., unreasonable but insistent
inhibitions against acts of expenditure as such.”30 Or it might reflect the pleasure of
performing what one deems a virtuous action that promises future individual, household,
or national wealth. Assume that the alternative was for people to dislike saving, and
therefore engage in as little of it as their prudence and altruism would permit. It seems
clear that a positive taste for saving would be better for society over time, since it would
permit present generations’ preferences and those of possibly more materialistic future
generations to be more consistent and mutually fulfillable. Accordingly, one could
imagine a benevolent government seeking through education to instill such a preference.
The argument is similar in form to that for having the government discourage, say, racial
hatred, or sadistic enjoyment of inflicting pain on other people—tastes that create even
greater conflicts between the satisfaction of one person’s preferences and another’s.
Such an argument for shaping current preferences has several problems, however. It
does not guide behavior prior to the change in preferences, and one cannot necessarily be
confident that the hoped-for change is feasible. Moreover, relying on the feasibility of
changing preferences, rather than working from revealed preferences, makes the whole
analysis rather open-ended. Why not posit instead that future generations can be educated
to be less materialistic, so that they will not mind our leaving them less in the way of
material goods? One also could debate how far people’s psychological flexibility extends: not only what sets of preferences are possible, but also whether different sets are,
in truth, equally enjoyable. Keynes, for example, in discussing the taste for “pure
29 Seater (1993) at 158.
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miserliness,” probably believed that it was not only socially destructive (given the need
for greater spending on consumption), but personally unsatisfying and constricting.31 Yet
his belief in this regard, while psychologically plausible, resists conventional proof or
disproof, given the difficulty of making interpersonal utility comparisons between misers
and free spenders so as to determine who is truly happier.
One more ground exists, however, for arguing that we need not evaluate a set of
difficult tradeoffs in order to conclude that present generations ought to save more. This
ground is perhaps the most promising, and certainly the most popular, of the three.
Various writers (mainly lawyers and economists)32 have argued on what one might term
procedural grounds that the level of private saving, or perhaps overall saving, in society
is generally likely to be too low. When present generations decide how much to save,
they are engaged in a one-sided transaction that has two-sided consequences. Future generations are affected by what we do, but they cannot bargain or even plead with us. At a
minimum, as Sen notes, this shows that we cannot rely upon the standard economic norm
of consumer sovereignty, and assume that the current level of saving, in light of the
market interest rate, is appropriate.33 However, one could take the argument a step
further, and assert, with Arthur Pigou, that the level of private saving will inevitably be
too low, and that the government therefore must act to increase national saving. Or, with
the modern, public choice-fueled skepticism about government of a James Buchanan, one
could argue that the government is likely to be part of the problem, rather than the
solution. This might suggest either despair or the need for a constitutional response such
as a balanced budget amendment. The following section assesses the argument that, on
procedural grounds, the national (or at least the private) saving rate is likely to be
inadequate from the standpoint of intergenerational justice.
30 Keynes (1936) at 108.
31 See Skidelsky (1976) (discussing Keynes’ rebellion against Victorian prudence and futuremindedness).
32 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 Duke L.J. 1077;
Buchanan & Wagner.
33 Sen (1961) at 486.
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B. Does the One-Sided Nature of Decision Making by Present Generations that Affects
Future Generations Suggest that the Level of Saving Will Be Too Low?
The claim that the national saving rate must be too low, relative to what it would be if
all affected parties’ interests were fairly represented, is familiar in form. Benefit to future
generations from saving seems a standard externality that present actors might be
expected to under-value, both in their private behavior and through the political process.
Contemporary political practice and preferences concerning budget deficits and unfunded
future obligations seem to provide rich anecdotal confirmation. The Ricardian claim of
multigenerational intrahousehold altruism may give one temporary pause, but perhaps the
incompleteness of Ricardian offsets shows that, at the margin, even if not unlimitedly so,
present generations are primarily selfish rather than altruistic. The procedural argument
that we tend to save too little does not require assuming that we are indifferent to future
generations’ well-being; only that we value it less than our own well-being.
An initial problem with the procedural argument concerns the implicit norm of
genuinely two-sided decision making, involving future as well as current generations,
that it seems to assume would be appropriate if only such a process were physically
possible. One could argue that, even as a thought experiment, the implicit norm is far
from clearly correct, and thus cannot strongly support the claim that we should save
more. Before assessing the claim that moving from membership in present generations to
the Rawlsian original position might be expected to enhance one’s concern for the
interests of future generations, it is useful to begin by considering two settings for the
coordination of different people’s interests that are more realistic and less abstract: the
marketplace and public decision making through politics.
Starting with the marketplace setting, one might imagine, as a thought experiment,
that if only future generations could be brought here for the limited purpose of expressing
their demand and affecting market prices, they would bid up the interest rate to a
sufficient level to increase saving and enable them to consume more. This is incorrect,
however. Even if one ignores the income effect—the fact that people may save less when
the interest rate is higher, since less saving is needed to reach one’s desired wealth
level—the theoretical loan transaction between present and future generations involves a
trade, whereas the reality involves an either/or choice. Saving past our own life spans
involves a one-way transfer of lifetime consumption from us to our heirs. Thus, a
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theoretical marketplace negotiation between present and future generations could not
give rise to a mutually agreeable allocation, any more than the poor could negotiate with
the rich in such a setting to determine the proper distribution of presently existing wealth.
The political setting may appear more promising as a thought experiment, since in
principle future generations could vote to require us to save more and thereby increase
their lifetime consumption relative to ours. Here, however, the difficulty lies in assuming
that one can use the political setting to decide, as a normative matter, who ought to
transfer wealth to whom. Since voting necessarily disregards the intensity of people’s
preferences, majority rule can yield transfers that are unjust or that reduce collective
well-being. Hence the concern with minority rights that dates back to Madison. Thus,
even if we are quite right, as a general matter, to allow wealth transfers through the political process, on the grounds that no better means of decision-making exists and that a notransfer norm is arbitrary, one cannot assume in any given case that the actual (or, under
the future-generations thought experiment, hypothetical) wealth-transfer outcome is
normatively appropriate. For example, what if future generations were to mandate, at the
hypothetical ballot box, our toiling like slaves for their benefit?
Thus, fixing procedural defects in the two main settings in which we decide how to
coordinate people’s interests would not yield a clearly better answer, even as a thought
experiment. Perhaps the modified-Rawlsian setting does more to make the case, since it
is plausible that moving from membership in present generations to the original position
might be expected to enhance one’s concern for the interests of future generations. Yet
one could argue that such a line of reasoning yields a false prediction. Suppose, for
example, that one makes the plausible assumption that we in present generations have
some intergenerational altruism, but attach greater weight to our own well-being,
especially relative to that of distant generations, and perhaps even relative to our own
children with respect to experiences they will have in the future when we can no longer
observe them. This might suggest the likelihood of negative real saving, leading to the
gradual depletion of existing resources, such that the standard of living would continually
decline, even if only modestly. In effect, one might expect to observe at least a moderate
version of Benjamin Friedman’s depiction of the man on a binge. This is counter-factual,
however, given the lengthy period in which we have had a positive national saving rate
and real per capita economic growth. (While it remains possible that present generations
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still under-value future generations’ interests, if from the modified-Rawlsian perspective
they would choose to make future generations better off still, one could argue that it is
difficult to accuse of insufficient altruism those who permit others to be better off than
themselves, but not by enough.)
How can one explain each recent historical generation’s apparent willingness to save
enough so that the next generation would do better, other than by positing what might
seem an implausible level of altruism? At least four different but perhaps supplementary
explanations are possible. First, the pressures of evolutionary survival, as a species and a
society, may select for future-mindedness beyond one’s life span—in effect, as a kind of
automatic reflex, even if at various margins we are selected to make rational choices
based on selfish motivations. Second, and more mundanely, as has been discussed in the
Ricardian literature, imperfect annuity markets may induce people to over-save against
the “risk” of living too long, and thus to leave behind substantial unconsumed wealth
when they die accidentally or prematurely. Third, the existence of constantly overlapping
generations may be significant. Inter-generational hypotheticals, for convenience, often
abstract to a setting where two distinct groups live at different times and never meet. In
practice, however, living generations have a range of expected life spans, continually
extending into the future as the population turns over. This may help to discourage the
strategy of drawing down present resources, by making it potentially disadvantageous to
a large percentage of the living. Fourth, technological advances offer new opportunities
to later-born generations that cannot be transported backwards with a time machine, and
that earlier-born generations may repeatedly under-estimate because the advances cannot
be imagined. Surely few in the mid-nineteenth century imagined that we would possess
items such as cars, television, supersonic jets, and personal computers.
Whatever the reason for earlier generations’ willingness to save at a rate that
permitted later generations to enjoy greater lifetime consumption, its long-standing
occurrence suggests that the basic picture, in which the living have all the power but the
unborn bear a part of the consequences, is inaccurate. Unborn generations have power, in
a sense, after all, whether due to influences on living generations’ behavior that mingle
the prudential with the altruistic, or because, by being born later, one gets to live at a time
when more has been accomplished and more is known. The situation is analogous to that
of a hypothetical society where the poor have all the political influence, but the
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government lacks the power or will to levy high taxes or engage in takings, with the
result that the rich, despite being political outcasts, are nonetheless better off, and in a
meaningful sense more powerful.
Thus, the procedural argument fails to establish that present generations save too
little, and thereby end up consuming too much, relative to future generations, from the
modified Rawlsian standpoint that I have posited. Impossibly hard though doing so may
be, we must look at the actual merits after all.
C. The Tradeoff Between Consumption by Present and Future Generations: Maximizing
Total Consumption Versus Equalizing Its Distribution
Again, the actual merits of the tradeoff between present and future consumption seem
exceptionally difficult to assess. Even apart from the theoretical ambiguities that lie
buried in my choice of a modified-Rawlsian standard—for example, what degree of risk
aversion is appropriate, and how steep a decline one should assume in the marginal utility
of wealth—there is pervasive empirical uncertainty concerning how the future will look
compared to the present, under different scenarios regarding the amount of present
saving.
Still, the analysis need not be unstructured, even if it is ultimately indeterminate.
Three main points come to mind. The first is the absence of a social discount rate across
life spans, given that a decisionmaker behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance would not
know when he was going to live. Thus, all else being equal (and ignoring any uncertainty
about whether future generations will in fact be born), one would prefer to trade X units
of consumption by people today for X + Y units of consumption in the future.
The second point to keep in mind is that such an uneven tradeoff is in fact presented
if saving generates a real positive return (as one might ordinarily expect, barring calamity
or social waste). The argument starts from the point that profitable investment, by
definition, increases the amount of wealth available for consumption—in effect,
permitting X + Y units of consumption later in lieu of X units of consumption now, where
Y is the real interest rate, or rate of growth for the economy, over the period of deferral.
Within the life of an individual, the potential for real growth does not establish that
deferring consumption is desirable, given the time value of consuming sooner to avoid
impatience. However, if present value discounting is inappropriate for future
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consumption by the unborn, since they are not yet experiencing impatience, then net
capital formation tends to increase aggregate utility for all generations, by increasing
future generations’ consumption by more than it reduces current generations’
consumption.
Indeed, the real interest rate probably understates the increase in the actual subjective
value of the increase in consumption opportunities that results from deferring
consumption in order to permit profitable investment. Later consumption may provide
more utility than earlier consumption, even without an increase in its dollar value, if
technological advances increase consumer surplus. To illustrate, assume that one person
living in the 1920s and another living in the 1990s have identical wealth, measured in
constant dollars, except that the latter person owns a television, video cassette recorder,
compact disk player, and computer (plus all the accessories needed to enjoy them) with a
total market value of $5,000. If the former person would have paid more than $5,000 to
own and enjoy those assets, and the latter would not renounce them for $5,000, then
surely the latter is more than $5,000 better off (at least in a material sense, which is all
that government fiscal policy can directly address). As evidence that the products created
by technological advances provide enormous consumer surplus, consider a recent survey
suggesting that nearly half of all Americans would refuse to give up television for the rest
of their lives for less than $1 million34—obviously far in excess of its lifetime cost to the
consumer.
These two points would seem to suggest that present generations should save more
than they in fact do—indeed, should save to the very limit of dynamic efficiency, at
which so much capital has been invested that its marginal efficiency declines to zero. The
third key point has opposite implications, however. It concerns the declining marginal
utility of wealth, as well as any appropriate decisional risk aversion—factors that tend to
limit the amount of net capital formation, beyond that necessary to maintain constant per
capita wealth, which is desirable. At some unknown point, as net capital formation
increases beyond the per capita maintenance level, the lifetime consumption opportunities of members of future generations become sufficiently greater than our own to
suggest that our descendants will derive less utility from X + Y additional units of
34 See $1 Million Not Enough to Make Some Give Up Television, in Chicago Tribune, October 5,
1992, at 3. (46 percent of those surveyed would require a payment of at least $1 million).
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consumption (or even X + Y + Z, including any increase in consumer surplus) than we
would from X units. Thus, a decisionmaker in the modified-Rawlsian setting would face a
tradeoff between optimizing the total amount of material consumption and optimizing its
distribution that is extremely difficult to resolve.
In what remains the best known (although the earliest) economic model designed to
determine the optimal rate of saving, Frank Ramsey deduced from the declining marginal
utility of wealth that the optimal rate of economic growth might constantly decline, as
increasing societal wealth reduced the marginal utility of consumption. Indeed, it
eventually might reach zero, at the point he termed “bliss,” where additional consumption
had lost all marginal utility, and where merely maintaining the existing wealth level
would therefore be optimal. More generally, in Ramsey’s model, under the assumptions
that the rate of return on capital declines as more is invested, and that the marginal utility
of consumption declines as overall consumption increases, one could specify that the
amount of capital investment should be set at precisely the level where its rate of return
would equal the percentage rate of decline in marginal utility.35
Even if one considers this specification to lack practical usefulness, and Ramsey’s
state of “bliss” to be practically or even theoretically unattainable, his model helps to
show, within the welfare economics tradition, the significance of the offset between longterm wealth maximization and equality of distribution. The rhetorical significance of
future generations’ presumed increasing wealth (assuming one accepts it) may be even
greater than its real significance in Ramsey’s rigorous social welfare terms. As Gordon
Tullock notes, people who are making charitable gifts tend to have little interest in increasing the welfare of those better off than themselves, and generally make gifts only to
those who appear worse off.36 Thus, the case for having the government play Robin Hood
in reverse, by changing its fiscal policy in a regressive direction, so as to shift
consumption from present to future generations, may have little appeal to many of us
once we understand it in these terms, despite the social welfare case for conveying real
benefits to our better-off descendants that exceed the real detriment to ourselves.
35 Frank Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 Economic Journal 543 (1928).
36 Gordon Tullock, The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment: Comment, 78
Quarterly J. of Economics 331, 334 (1964).
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Should we assume increasing per capita wealth, however? Such an increase does not
follow logically from net capital formation alone, since in principle the population could
grow more rapidly from the economy. An expectation of increasing per capital wealth
does follow, however, from making the admittedly controversial assumption that longstanding historical trends will continue. In both the United States and western Europe,
per capita wealth and lifetime consumption have been increasing fairly steadily, and in
the aggregate dramatically, for many centuries (subject, of course to various troughs such
as the Great Depression and those caused by war, and to changes in the degree of
distributional inequality). The continuing rapid pace of technological development
provides some ground, at least, for believing that this trend will continue.
At a minimum, surely long-standing history and the course of technology create
enough of an inference of increasing per capita wealth to require an explanation of why
one should expect anything different in the future. Moreover, such an explanation must
fall into a broad middle ground in order to support the conclusion that present generations
should save more. Suppose, for example, that the world is headed for an imminent
nuclear catastrophe, given the seemingly inevitable dissemination of nuclear weapons.
Increasing saving would make little sense under this scenario. The lack of a significant
future would suggest consuming all the more while still we can.
The middle-ground pessimism that would support increasing saving is not wholly
implausible, however. A number of present trends arguably, although controversially,
may support it. Consider, for example, the relative aging of the United States population,
owing to long-term demographic trends along with the effects of new medical
technologies that can keep sick people alive for longer (although, perhaps, not always
making them better off) at enormous expense. Or consider arguments that topsoil erosion
and the effects of maximum-yield farming will lead soon to a reversal of recent enormous
increases in farming productivity.37 Moreover, some have argued that mankind is
reaching the point of exhausting the Earth’s finite fuel resources, and at the same time is
generating toxic waste products in volumes that will soon exceed the tolerance of a well37 See, e.g., D. Pimenta et al, Land Degradation: Effects on Food and Energy Resources, 194 Science
149-155 (1976); R. A. Brink et al, Soil Deterioration and the Growing World Demand for Food, 197
Science 625-630 (1977).
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functioning (from our perspective) global environment.38 The threat of global warming,
potentially resulting in widespread flooding of densely populated coastal areas and
desertification of areas that at present are agriculturally productive, is only one example
of such dangers. The staggering pace of world demographic growth, particularly in
relatively impoverished Third World nations, excites understandable concern as well.39 A
further set of threats relates to war, social breakdown, and the possible worldwide effects
of evil regimes, akin to those in Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Russia (or any number of
contemporary examples, from Cambodia to Iraq to Rwanda to Haiti) that may do enough
harm to make our descendants worse off than ourselves, yet conceivably without
rendering present investment futile.
These fears have tended, perhaps, to excite greater skepticism in the economics
profession than elsewhere. Many economists recall how frequently such fears have been
expressed from time to time (yet never fulfilled) since at least the days of Thomas
Malthus. Under the optimistic view that some economists prefer, population growth
merely increases the stock of human capital, which Julian Simon terms the “ultimate
resource,”40 and increases the attainable scale efficiencies in providing people with goods
and services. Moreover, apparent resource limitations have frequently been solved in the
past by the advance of technology, driven by marketplace incentives, as well as by
market-driven increases in resource substitution, recycling, and intensity of search for
resources as they become more costly.41 Yet the optimistic view does not necessarily
extend to political and social dangers, and even for scarce material resources it is
unprovable as applied to the future, however frequently it has been correct in the past.42
38 See, e.g., Donella & Dennis Meadows, Jorgen Randers, & William Behrens III, The Limits to
Growth (New York: Universe Books 1972).
39 See, e.g., Kenneth E. Boulding, Sources of Reasonable Hope for the Future, 74 Am. Econ. Rev.
221, 222 (19__).
40 Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 198 1).
41 See, e.g., Harold T. Barnett & Chandler Morse, Scarcity and Growth: The Economics of Natural
Resource Availability (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Unuv. 1963).
42 See, e.g., Nicholas Georegescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process (Cambridge:
Harvard U. Press 1971) (discussing the significance of material entropy, or our ongoing diffusion of
concentrated natural resources and conversion of productive resources into waste products); V. Kerry
Smith & John V. Krutilla, Economic Growth, Resource Availability, and Environmental Quality, 74 Am.
Econ. Rev. 226, 227-230 (19__) (discussing theoretical and practical challenges in the economic literature
to the optimistic Barnett-Morse analysis).
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Thus, one surely could make the case for increased saving, based on the view either
that things will generally get worse (but not so bad as to eliminate the future benefit from
present saving) or that, while things will continue to get better, the benefit of increasing
growth outweighs the detriment of regressive redistribution as between present and future
generations. Yet making the case with any great sense of certainty would seem to require
either obtuseness or unfounded confidence in one’s intuitions about the future.
The most defensible stance, from a modified-Rawlsian perspective, appears to be one
of skepticism concerning any strong claims about the proper level of saving. One might
nonetheless accept or even welcome people’s voluntary decision to save more, whether
expressed in the private saving rate or in political demands for changing government
fiscal policy, on the ground that present generations presumptively are not injured by
something that they do voluntarily. Yet one cannot easily justify attempting to mandate
such a result, wholly apart from changes in taste, by prescribing complex and difficult
systemic changes to government fiscal policy, such as the adoption of a balanced budget
amendment or a generational accounting version thereof.
Perhaps the strongest ground for reducing the present tendency of government fiscal
policy to shift lifetime consumption from future to present generations arises under a kind
of insurance argument. Under this argument, one would concede that the public debt
burden on future generations may turn out not to matter, either because things go so well
that it becomes trivial, or because things go so badly that greater present saving would
not have helped. Since it might turn out to matter, however, we ostensibly have an
obligation to ensure that we do not leave our descendants to live worse lives materially,
or insufficiently better lives, than our own.
Such a view would be most plausible if one adopted a measure of generational equity
under which parents had a moral obligation to ensure that their descendants will be able
to live better than themselves. Under my modified-Rawlsian view, which treats all
generations as presumptively equal, there is no particular reason why one should insure
against our descendants’ misfortune, rather than our own. Given the widespread poverty
and hardship in the world today, and even in a relatively affluent country like the United
States, why not insure instead against the risk that our descendants will be vastly
wealthier than us, or that saving will prove futile due to a calamity? The insurance
argument therefore leads in no particular direction under the modified Rawlsian view
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unless one can show why the decision-makers behind the veil of ignorance would one
regard one particular risk among the many that are discernible as particularly worth
insuring against.
Given the range of empirical and philosophical uncertainties that impede evaluating
the tradeoff between present and future consumption, one could powerfully argue that
intergenerational policy should not be at center stage, either in the deficit debate or more
generally. To illustrate this point, consider Laurence Kotlikoff’s typology of governmental policy as dividing into four fundamental categories, of which generational
policy is one. The other three types are spending policy (how much the government
consumes over time), distortionary policy (how the government’s actions affect people’s
economic choices), and intra-generational distribution policy (concerning the allocation
of benefits and burdens between the richer and poorer members of each generation).43
Arguably, all three merit more overall attention than generational policy, although only
spending policy is directly implicated by the deficit debate.
Spending policy is important due to the potentially great differences in how
efficiently the government, as compared to private parties, uses economic resources.
Whether one subscribes to the limited government school of a James Buchanan, and
views government as a leviathan that wastes resources because voters are more aware of
the benefits it provides than of its costs, or to the view that, due to voters’ collective
action problems, government does too little to correct market failures and supply public
goods,44 one should agree that the size of government can significantly affect aggregate
social wealth.
Distortionary policy resembles spending policy in its capacity to affect aggregate
social wealth. While one can argue either in favor of government-imposed distortions as
responding to externalities, or against them as leading to deadweight social loss, either
way such policy’s significance is clear. Consider Martin Feldstein’s long-standing
argument that taxes and regulation bear much of the responsibility for declining rates of
economic growth since the early 1970s. Even if this claim is overstated, and
technological or cultural trends (to name two possibilities) had more to do with slowing
the rate of growth, there remains ample anecdotal confirmation that distortionary policy
43 Kotlikoff (1992) at 91.
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often causes large-scale social waste in particular instances. One example is provided by
the still-empty office buildings, in cities across the country, that were built in the early
1980s in response to tax incentives that left investors relatively unconcerned about pretax
profitability. Another is provided by the $200 billion savings and loan bailout, which in
part represents a real social loss reflecting bad investments made by managers of savings
and loan institutions whose incentive to weigh downside risk was reduced by federal
banking law.45 Avoiding policy disasters such as those caused by tax and banking law in
the early 1980s arguably is more important (and more unmistakably beneficial) than
increasing overall saving, reducing the budget deficit, or moving in the direction of a
generationally balanced fiscal policy.
Finally, intra-generational distribution policy arguably is more important than
generational policy even though the two turn on similar tradeoffs between the often
competing goals of maximizing overall wealth and equalizing the distribution of wealth.
One reason for paying greater attention to intra-generational distribution policy is that the
rich and poor among a single generation tend to differ more in wealth than do the average
members of age cohorts with overlapping life spans. A second reason for placing greater
emphasis on intragenerational distribution policy is the difference in our level of
knowledge about the groups whose wellbeing one is attempting to affect. One can never
hope to know as much about future generations (their level of wealth, behavioral
patterns, and so forth) as about currently living groups in the society.
Thus, if generational policy were the only substantive issue raised by budget deficits,
one would be tempted to conclude that deficits do not merit nearly the level of attention
that they have received in the political process in recent years. If they are as important as
many have believed, then it must be for other reasons. The main such reasons, which
relate to their macroeconomic effects and their tendency to permit government spending
to be greater than it would be if full current tax financing were necessary, are no less
important than the intergenerational issue, but lie beyond the scope of this article.

44 See, e.g., [cite Anthony Downs & Olson, as per Michael Hayes or Eskridge & Frickey at 55-56].
45 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America’s Banking System: The Origins and
Future of the Current Crisis, 69 Wash. U.L.Q. 769 (1991) (noting the widely accepted view of “federally
subsidized deposit insurance as an essential element of the current crisis”).
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